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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

Nature of the Case
This is a legal malpractice case. Appellants, Walter C. Minnick and A.K. Lienhart Minnick

(collectively, the "Minnicks"), sued Respondents, the law firm of Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley
("HTEH") and HTEH attorney Geoffrey Wardle ("Wardle"), regarding the legal services
Respondents provided in the context of a real estate transaction. Complaint and Demand for Jury

Trial,

~

15 (R. pp. 000008-9). Part of this transaction included a conservation easement that was

recorded on September 7, 2006. Jd. at ~ 29. (R. p. 000011).
It is undisputed that the Respondents did not review the conservation easement to ensme that

it complied with the requirements necessary to constitute a charitable donation under the Internal
Revenue Code and applicable regulations. Nevertheless, the Minnicks claimed the conservation
easement was a tax-deductible charitable donation worth $941,000 on their 2006,2007, and 2008
tax returns. Jd. at

~~

35-37. (R. p. 000012-13). On July 8, 2009, the Internal Revenue Service

("I.R.S.") notified the Minnicks that the deductions were disallowed for failme to comply with the
Internal Revenue Code and applicable regulations governing the tax deductibility of conservation
easements as charitable donations. Jd. at ~ 38. (R. p. 000013).
In the Complaint, the Minnicks claim that it was negligent for the Respondents not to review

the conservation easement to ensme that it would meet the requirements necessary to constitute a
tax-deductible donation for income tax purposes, "including but not limited" to the requirements
identified in 26 C.P.R. § 1.170A-14(g)(2) and (g)(6). Jd.

at~~53-56

(emphasis added). (R. p. 000015-

16). The Milmicks further allege that this alleged negligence proximately caused them to: (l) lose
the tax benefits that would have been associated with the conservation easement; (2) incm penalties
BRlEF OF RESPONDENTS HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS AND HAWLEY, LLP, AND GEOFFREY M.
WARDLE-l

and fees associated with the disallowed deductions and unpaid taxes; and (3) incur the costs
associated with retaining legal counsel to "protect and prosecute their interests." fd. at ~~ 59-60. CR.
p.000016-17).
Respondents vigorously deny the Minnicks' allegations. Respondents contend it was
reasonable for them not to review the conservation easement for tax purposes, because:
Ca) Mr. Minnick dictated the terms of the parties' relationship and
requested that Respondents provide only those services he
specifically requested;
Cb) Mr. Minnick did not tell the respondents he intended to claim the
conservation easement was a gift for income tax purposes or
otherwise request personal income tax advice; and
(c) the conservation easement did not look anything like a gift,
because it was a condition of plat approval and the Minnicks did not
give up anything of value given applicable zoning restrictions.
See Defendant's ll.femorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motionfor Partial Summary Judgment,

pp. 16-20 CR. pp. 00604-608). Respondents further contend that the alleged negligent conduct has
no impact whatsoever on the Mim1icks' inability to obtain favorable tax treatment for the
conservation easement, because the conservation easement was not a gift; it was a condition of plat
approval and the Minnicks did not give up anything of value given applicable zoning restrictions.
fd.

These disputes offact are provided for background purposes only. They speak to the merits
ofthe Minnicks' claims and the Respondents' affirmative defenses. However, they are not material
to the district court's decision dismissing the Minnicks' claims on statute oflimitations grounds.
In contrast, the following facts are both undisputed and material to a decision applying the
statute of limitations to the Minnicks' claim:
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS AND HAWLEY, LLP, AND GEOFFREY M.
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(1)

Respondents did not review the conservation easement for tax
purposes or otherwise provide the Minnicks with tax advice;

(2)

the Minnicks claimed the conservation easement was a
charitable gift worth $941,000 for the purpose of an income
tax deduction on their 2006,2007, and 2008 federal income
tax returns;

(3)

on June 1,2009, the Minnicks hired separate tax counsel to
help them address the I.R.S. 's concerns about the deductions;

(4)

on July 8, 2009, the I.R.S. sent the Minnicks a formal notice
that the claimed deductions for the conservation easement
were disallowed; and

(5)

this lawsuit was commenced on June 7, 2012 when the
Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial was filed.

See Memorandum in Support ofP laint~fJ's A10tionfor Partial Summary Judgment, pp. 14-15 CR. pp.

000283-84).
The district court properly dismissed the Minnicks' Complaint on statute of limitations
grounds. Pursuant to Idaho Code Section 5-219(4), an action for professional malpractice must be
commenced within two years after the cause of action accrues. The district court held, as a matter
of law, that the cause of action accrued on: (1) June 1, 2009 when the Minnicks hired separate tax
counsel to defend them in the Tax Court proceedings or, alternatively, (2) July 8, 2009, at the latest,
when the Minnicks were notified that their income tax deductions were disallowed. The lawsuit was
filed more than two years later.
The district court properly rejected the Minnicks' argument that their cause of action did not
accrue until June 14,2011 when they discovered for the first time that the mortgage had not been
subordinated to the conservation easement. See also Complaint, ~~ 43-44 (R. pp. 000013-000014).
The district court determined, based on Mr. Minnick's sworn testimony offered in the Tax Court
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS AND HAWLEY, LLP, AND GEOFFREY M.
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proceedings and the allegations set forth in the Complaint, that the Minnicks claim they retained the
Defendants to handle all aspects of the conservation easement, including the tax implications.
Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Defendant's 1l1otion for Summary Judgment, pp. 7-9,
(R. pp. 000725- 000727. Accordingly, the cause of action accrued as soon as the Minnicks retained
separate tax counsel to address any tax problem associated with the conservation easement. ld.
Once the Minnicks hired separate tax counsel, they suffered a legally cognizable harm associated
with the negligence alleged -- that is, the Respondents' failure to provide them with personal income
tax advice.
The district court also properly granted the Respondents' request for fees as the prevailing
party pursuant to Idaho Code Section 12-121(3). In their Complaint, the Minnicks requested
attorneys fees pursuant to I.e. § 12-120(3) alleging that the parties' relationship was "commercial
in nature." Complaint and Demandfor Jury Trial, ~~ 52, 60. (R.pp. 000016-17). Nevertheless, when
faced with a similar request from the Respondents after they had prevailed on summary judgment,
the Minnicks changed their position and argued both below, and now on appeal, that the underlying
transaction was not commercial in nature. Because the underlying relationship involved a real estate
development project, the district court was con-ect in characterizing the relationship as commercial
in nature.

The district court's decisions granting summary judgment and awarding the Respondents
their attorneys fees should be upheld. The decisions are based on undisputed facts and controlling
Idaho Supreme Court precedent. To ovel1urn the district court's decisions, the Idaho Supreme Court
must reconsider and overturn its own precedents.
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B.

Procedural History
The Minnicks' summary of the proceedings before the district court is accurate in terms of

the dates of the various submissions. However, the procedural history neglects to identify the
allegations and claims as framed in the pleadings and the legal basis for the district court's decisions
on summary judgment and regarding the request for fees. These three issues are addressed below.

1.

The Allegations and Claims as Framed in the Pleadings.

The allegations in the Complaint reflect that the Respondents were not hired solely to prepare
the conservation easement and subordinate the mortgage. First, the conservation easement was but
one part of a larger real estate development proj ect:
(l) the Mimlicks hired Respondents to provide professional legal
services "on a real estate development project known as Shovvy Phlox
Subdivision.... " (Complaint and Demand/or Jury Trial, ~ 15);

(2) a "feature of the proposed development project would be a
conservation easement to be granted to the Land Trust ofthe Treasure
Valley, Inc. ("Land Trust")." (ld. at ~ 17); and
(3) "On September 6, 2006, Wardle presented Minnick with a large
number of agreements, instruments and documents requiring his
signature, including the revised and finalized Conservation Easement
Agreement. ... " (ld. at ~ 28).
(R. pp. 000008-10).
Second, in the Complaint, the Minnicks allege that they hired the Respondents to assist with
all aspects of the transaction at issue. The Minnicks allege they were:
[R]elying and depending on the law firm to address any and all legal
issues and concerns related to the Development Project and essential
to achieving its objectives, including those directly related to and
potentially affecting the conservation easement and the Plaintiffs'
ability to obtain a charitable tax deduction for the conservation
easement gift.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS AND HAWLEY, LLP, AND GEOFFREY M.
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Id. at ~ 20. (R.pp. 000009-10).

On January 14, 2013, the Respondents filed an Answer with a number of affirmative
defenses. (R.pp. 19-29). These included, inter alia: (1) comparative negligence of the Minnicks;
(2) estoppel; (3) statute of limitations; and (4) the "allegations of damages due to disallowed
charitable deduction by the I.R.S. and U.S. Tax Court are damages Plaintiffs would have sustained
for reasons other than a failure to subordinate liens on the subject property for reasons that have
nothing to do with any conduct on the part of the Defendants." Answer, pp. 7-8. (R.pp. 000025-26).

2.

Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment

Both parties filed motions for summary judgment. On August 8,2013, Respondents filed a
Motion for Summary Judgment solely focused on the statute oflimitations issue. (R.pp.000028-29).
This motion was supported by an affidavit from counsel. (R. p. 000047-265).
On August 16, 2013, the Milmicks filed a motion for summary judgment on four of the
Defendants' affirmative defenses, including the statute oflimitations defense. (R.pp. 000266-69).
The Respondents' motion was supported by affidavits from: (1) Ada County Development Staff
Member Steven Malone (R. pp. 000309-314); (2) Land Trust of the Treasure Valley Executive
Director Tim Breuer (R. pp. 000315-336); and (3) tax attorney Tim A. Tmier, the Minnicks' counsel
in the Tax Court proceedings (R. pp. 000337-586). In opposition to the Minnicks' motion for
summary judgment, Plaintiffs filed affidavits from: (1) counsel (R. pp. 000614-648); (2) Respondent
Wardle (R. pp. 000649-652); and (3) HTEH attorney Brian Ballard (R. pp. 000653-657).
The district court held a hearing on both motions on October 2,2013. (R. pp. 000045-46).
On October 28,2013, the district judge issued a decision granting Respondents' motion for summary

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS AND HAWLEY, LLP, AND GEOFFREY M.
WARDLE - 6

judgment effectively dismissing the Complaint on the basis that it was untimely pursuant to Idaho
Code Section 5-219(4). See .Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Defendants' A1otionfor
Summary Judgment (R pp. 719-29).

The Minnicks argued below and again on appeal that the alleged negligence was specific to
the Respondent's failure to obtain a subordination agreement with the lender before recording the
conservation easement. The district court rejected this argument. The district court examined the
allegations in the Complaint at paragraphs 22 through 24 and Mr. Minnick's January 14, 2013
affidavit submitted to the Tax Court l and determined the Minnicks retained Respondents to handle
all matters related to the easement and charitable deduction:
[T]he Court finds that (1) without limitation, the Plaintiffs expected
the Defendants to structure the transaction so as to allow them to
claim the easement as a charitable donation and (2) for the purposes
of this motion, the scope of the Defendants' representation included
any and all issues related to the recording of the easement and the
related charitable deduction.
},lemorandum Decision and Order Granting Defendants' Motionfor Summary Judgment, p. 8. (Rp.

000726).
Given the scope of representation, the district court concluded the Minnicks suffered some
damage on June 1,2009 when they retained counsel to represent them in the I.RS. proceedings. Id.
"Since ... the scope of representation encompassed all tasks related to the charitable deduction, the
statute oflimitations began to run as soon as the Plaintiffs retained new counsel to help them resolve
the charitable deduction dispute with the I.R.S." Id.

1 See Affidavit of Walter C. Minnick ("Minnick AfJ."), attached as Ex. A to Exhibit T of
the Affidavit of Tim A. Tarter ("Tarter AfJ."). (R pp. 498-503).
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The Court also determined the Minnicks "were specifically notified" that their deduction
would be disallowed on July 8, 2009. Id. at p. 9. CR. p. 000727). Accordingly and alternatively, the
statute of limitations began to run no later than July 8, 2009. Id.

3.

District Court's Decision on Fees and Costs

On November 12,2013, the Respondents filed a Motion for Attorneys Fees and Costs. (R.
pp. 000730-31). It is undisputed that Respondents, as the prevailing party, are entitled to their costs
pursuant to Idaho Code Section 54( d)(1 )(A). In addition, pursuant to Idaho Code Section 12-120(3),
Respondents sought their attorneys fees in the amount of$ 62,760.00 on the basis that the underlying
transaction, the real estate development project, was a commercial transaction. See Defendants'

Verified Memorandum of Attorneys' Fees and Costs, pp. 3-4 (R. pp. 000734-35). The Minnicks
opposed the motion arguing that the transaction at issue was personal in nature. See Memorandum

in Support ofPlaintiffs 'Objection to Defendants' Motionfor an Avvard ofAttorneys Fees and Costs
and Memorandum of Fees and Costs (R. pp. 000750-63). The Minnicks also argued that the fees
sought were umeasonable. Id.
On December 30,2013, the district court issued a decision granting the Respondents' request
for fees as the prevailing party but reduced the amount requested to $50,000. Memorandum Decision

and Order on Defendant's Motion for Attorneys Fees and Costs. (R. p. 00078-0-790). The district
court determined that the transaction at issue was commercial, as reflected by the Minnicks' request
for fees under Section 12-120(3) claimed in their Complaint. Id. at p. 8 (R. p. 000787).
Nevertheless, the Court reduced the fee in part, because the billing records submitted in support of
the fees request were redacted and the COUli could not fully assess how much time and labor was
required in the case. Id. at p. 9 (R. p. 000788).
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C.

Statement of Facts 2
The Minnicks had been clients of the Respondent law firm for quite some time when, in

February 2006, they engaged Respondents "on a real estate development project known as Shovvy
Phlox Estates Subdivision." Complaint and Demand/or Jury Trial,

~

15. (R. p. 000008). The

development was comprised of seven single family, residential housing lots of approximately ten
acres each on a 73.81 acre site. Jd.

at'~

15-16 (R. p. 000009). One of the features of the project was

a conservation easement that was eventually granted to the Land Trust of the Treasure Valley. Jd.
at, 17

CR. p. 000009).
The Minnicks allege that they told Respondent Wardle that they desired and intended to

obtain certain income tax advantages associated with the conservation easement. Jd. at' 19 (R. p.
000009). The Minnicks further allege that they:
were relying and depending upon the law firm to address any and all
legal issues and concerns related to the Development Project and
essential to achieving its objectives, including those directly related
to and potentially affecting the conservation easement and the
Plaintiff's ability to obtain a charitable tax deduction for the
conservation easement gift.
Jd. at, 20 (R. pp. 000009-10). Also according to the Minnicks, Respondent Wardle acknowledged

"there were tax issues and related legal concerns affecting the conservation easement that needed
to be appreciated and addressed" and "he would engage other attorneys within Hawley Troxell with
tax law expertise to assist him on addressing and resolving these matters." Id. at ~ 24 (R. p. 000010).

2 Because the district court's decision was based on the Respondents' motion for
summary judgment, the "facts" are drawn from the allegations in the Minnicks' Complaint and
affidavits. Many of these facts are disputed by the Respondents.
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On September 6, 2006, in the context of executing a number of other documents required to
accomplish the legal subdivision of the property, Mr. Minnick signed the conservation easement
agreement. ld. at Ctf 28 (R. p. 000011). The next day, the conservation easement was recorded with
the Ada County Recorder's Office. ld.
The parties do not dispute that there are a number of requirements that must be met in order
for a conservation easement to qualify for a tax deduction pursuant to the Internal Revenue Code and
related regulations. The two requirements specifically identified in the Complaint are the mortgage
subordination requirement and the proceeds requirement. ld. at ~~ 26 -27 (R. p. 000011).
Respondents do not dispute that the conservation easement did not meet either requirement.
In fact, Respondents concede that they did not review the conservation easement for personal income
tax purposes and, as a result, the conservation easement did not meet a number of other
requirements, including the basic element of "donative intent" required to constitute a charitable gift.

See Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to Plaint~ffs' MotionforSummaryJudgment,pp.16-20.
(R. pp. 000604-608).
On June 20, 2008, the Minnicks first received notice that their 2006 federal income tax return
was selected for audit with specific focus on "Schedule A- Contributions- Conservation Easement."
(R.pp. 338, ~ 5; 344-46). After initial efforts to resolve the dispute proved ineffective, the Minnicks
hired a tax attorney, Tim Tarter, on June 1,2009. (R.p. 338,

~

4).

On July 8, 2009, the I.R.S. provided the Minnicks with two Notice of Disallowance letters,
one for 2006, and the other for the carry-over deductions for 2007 and 2008. (R.pp. 347-58 (2006),
pp. 359-73 (2007,2008). Included with these Notices are the Examiner Reports, which provide the
I.R.S. Examiner's reasoning for disallowing the deduction. Affidavit of Tim A. Tarter,

~
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8. CR. p.

0000338). In these documents, the I.R.S. notified the Minnicks that their income tax deductions for
the conservation easement were disallowed because "[t]he taxpayers have not demonstrated that the
easement met the statutory requirements for a conservation contribution." (R.pp. 350,361).
The Examiner Reports outline several reasons why the conservation easement fails to meet
the statutory requirements for a conservation contribution, specifically including the requirement that
the contribution be made "exclusively for conservation purposes" as outlined in Internal Revenue
Code Section 170(h)(1)3 and Treasury Regulation Section 1.170A-14(a).4 (R.pp. 000355-356,
000366-67) (emphasis added). The Notice further outlines that a contribution will be deemed
"exclusively for conservation purposes" only if it is protected in perpetuity as defined under Internal
Revenue Code Sections 170 (h)(4) and 170(h)(5). (R.pp. 356,367).
Internal Revenue Code Section 170(h)(4) generally describes what purposes qualify as
conservation purposes. 26 U.S.c. § 170(h)(4). For example, the conservation contribution may
preserve land for the general public's outdoor recreation or education; protect relatively natural
habitats; preserve open space; or preserve historically important land or structures. ld.

3 26 U.S.C. § 170(h)(1) states:
"[T]he term 'qualified conservation contribution' means a contribution (A) of a qualified real property interest,
(B) to a qualified organization,
(C) exclusively for conservation purposes.

426 C.F.R. § 1.170A-14(a) states that a "deduction under section 170 is generally not
allowed for a charitable contribution of any interest in property that consists of less than the
donor's entire interest in the property." 26 CFR § 1. 170A-14(a). The regulations outlines that
there is an exception to this rule for "qualified conservation contributions" but "[t]o be eligible
for a deduction under his section, the conservation purpose must be protected in perpetuity."
ld. (emphasis added).
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS AND HAWLEY, LLP, AND GEOFFREY M.
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Internal Revenue Code Section 170(h)(5) provides that "[a] contribution shall not be treated
as exclusively for conservation purposes unless the conservation purpose is protected in perpetuity."
26 U.s.C. § 170(h)(5)(A) (the "perpetuity requirement"). To satisfy the perpetuity requirement, the
taxpayer must show:
(1) if the property is subject to a mortgage that "the mortgagee
subordinates its rights in the property to the right of the qualified
organization to enforce the conservation purposes of the gift in
perpetuity," 26 CFR § 1.170A-14(g)(2) ("mortgage subordination
requirement") and
(2) in case the conservation easment is extinguished, the proceeds of
the conservation easement must inure to the benefit of the donee
organization, 26 CFR § 1. 170A-14(g)(6) ("proceeds requirement").
The Examiner Reports also reflect that the Minnicks "contend that the conservation easement
qualifies as a charitable contribution" and "the only issue that should be considered is the value
placed on the contribution." (R.pp. 358,369). Despite the Minnicks' perspective on the issue, the
Examiner Reports show the I.R.S. was clearly looking into many other areas, including the perpetuity
requirements of26 U.S.c. § 170(h)(5). (R.pp. 352-58, pp. 363-69).
On September 17, 2009, the I.R.S. issued the Minnicks a notice of deficiency seeking unpaid
taxes and penalties for 2007 and 2008. Complaint and Demand/or Jury Trial,

~

40 (R. p. 000013).

In response, the Minnicks filed a petition in the United States Tax Court ("Tax Comi") on December
14,2009, challenging the disallowance of the deductions. ld. at ~ 41.
On June 11, 2011, in the context of the Tax Court proceedings, the I.R.S. specifically
requested documentation related to the loan subordination issue. ld. at ~ 43. The Minnicks allege
that this is the first time they "discovered" the mortgage subordination issue. ld. at ~ 44.
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II. ADDITIONAL ISSUES ON APPEAL
The following additional issue is presented on appeal: (1) Whether the Respondents are
entitled to attorneys fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code Section 12-121(3).
III. ARGUMENTS
A.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
When reviewing an order for summary judgment, the Idaho Supreme Court applies the same

standard of review that was used by the trial cOUli in ruling on the motion. Indian Springs LLC v.

Indian Springs Land Inv., LLC, 147 Idaho 737,746,215 P.3d 457, 466 (2009). Pursuant to Idaho
Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), summary judgment is appropriate "ifthe pleadings, depositions, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter oflaw." LR.C.P.56(c).
B.

LEGAL REQUIREMENTS FOR CONSERVATION EASEMENTS TO QUALIFY AS
TAX-DEDUCTIBLE DONATIONS
Section 170 of the Internal Revenue Code provides the statutory basis for charitable

contribution deductions: "There shall be allowed as a deduction any charitable contribution ...
payment of which is made within the taxable year." 26 U.S.c. § 170(a). A charitable contribution
may include a gift of property to a charitable organization provided the gift is made with charitable
intent and without the receipt or expectation of receipt of actual consideration. See Hernandez v.

Comm 'r, 490 U.S. 680,690 (1989); United States v. Am. Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. 105, 116-118
(1986).
Generally taxpayers are not allowed a deduction for a gift of property that constitutes less
than the taxpayer's entire property interest. Esgar Corp. v. CI.R., 744 F.3d 648, 657 (lOth Cir.
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2014); see also 26 U.S.c. § 170(£)(3) ("Denial of deduction in case of certain contributions ofpartial

interests in property") (emphasis added».

However, the Internal Revenue Code includes an

exception to this rule for "qualified conservation contribution[s ]." 26 U.S.C. § 170(£)(3)(B)(iii). To
constitute a "qualified conservation contribution," the gift at issue must be: (1) a qualified real
property interest; (2) to a qualified organization; (3) exclusively for conservation purposes." 26
usc. § 170(h)(1).
The I.R.S. determined that the Milmicks' conservation easement failed to meet the
requirements necessary to demonstrate that it was made "exclusively for conservation purposes" as
required under 26 U.S.C. § 170(h)(1). (R. 000354, 365). In order to meet the "exclusively for
conservation purposes" requirement, the contribution must satisfy the requirements of section
170(h)(4) and (5), as well as related regulations.
The requirements of Internal Revenue Code Section 170(h)(4) are not at issue in these
proceedings. However, Section 170(h)(5) provides that no contribution will "be treated as
exclusively for a conservation purposes unless the conservation purpose is preserved in

perpetuity." 26 U.S.c. § 170(h)(5) (emphasis added).
The federal regulations provide further guidance regarding the perpetuity requirement
outlined in Internal Revenue Code Section 170(h)(5). }v1itchell v. C.IR., 106 T.C.M. (CCH) 215
(T.C. 2013), 2013 WL 4606294, *5 ("Section 1.170A-14(g), Income Tax Regs., elaborates on the
enforceability-in-perpetuity requirement."). First, the conservation easement "must be subject to
legally enforceable restrictions ... that will prevent uses of the retained interest inconsistent with
the conservation purposes of the donation." 26 C.F .R. § 170A-14(g)( 1). This requirement recognizes
that the conservation easement is a grant of a partial interest in the property: typically, the right to
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develop the property. The property owner may retain all other rights to the property, including the
right of possession and use. Accordingly, the property owner cannot exercise the property rights it
retains in a way that would undermine or diminish the conservation values that are intended to be
protected by the contribution.
Second is the mortgage subordination requirement. If there is a mOligage on the propeliy,
the mortgagor must subordinate its rights in the property to the right of the qualified organization.
"[N]o deduction will be permitted ... for an interest in property which is subject to a mOligage
unless the mortgagee subordinates its rights in the property to the right of the ... [donee]
organization to enforce the conservation purposes of the gift in perpetuity." 26 C.F.R. § 170A14(g)(2). This is necessary in case the property owner defaults on the loan secured by the mortgage
and the propeliy is foreclosed or otherwise comes into the possession of the mortgagee. If the
mortgage is not subordinated to the conservation easement, then there is a risk that the property will
revert back to the mortgagee without any of the conservation protections in place.
Third is the proceeds requirement. See 26 C.F.R. §170A-14(g)(6). The easement must
provide for judicial extinguishment in the event there is an unexpected change in the conditions
surrounding the property that make it impossible or impractical to continue use of the property for
conservation purposes. 26 C.F.R. § 170A-14(g)(6)(i). In addition, all of the donee's proceeds from
a subsequent sale or exchange of the property must be used in a mam1er consistent with the
conservation purposes of the original contribution." Jd. Further,
for a deduction to be allowed under this section, at the time of the gift
the donor must agree that the donation of the perpetual conservation
restriction gives rise to a property right immediately vested in the
donee organization with a fair market value that is at least equal to the
proportionate value that the perpetual conservation restriction at the
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time of the gift bears to the value of the property as a whole at that
time.
26 C.P.R. § 170A-14(g)(6)(ii).
It is undisputed that the Respondents did not review the Minnicks' conservation easement

to ensure it complied with these requirements. As a result, the conservation easement failed to meet
a number of requirements necessary to constitute a charitable contribution for federal income tax
purposes.

In their Complaint, the Minnicks outline two of these deficiencies, the mortgage

subordination and proceeds requirements, and indicate that there may be others. Complaint and

DemandforJury Trial,
C.

~

56. (R. pp. 000015-16).

THE TRIAL CORRECTLY DECIDED THE MINNICKS' CLAIMS ARE TIMEBARRED PURSUANT TO IDAHO CODE § 5-219(4).
"An action to recover damages for 'professional malpractice' must be commenced within two

years after the cause of action has accrued.'" Lapham v. Stewart, 137 Idaho 582, 585,51 P.3d 396,
399 (2002); I.c. § 5-219(4). The cause of action accrues "as of the time of the occurrence, act, or
omission complained of." LC. § 5-219(4).
In some professional negligence cases, the conduct comprising the negligence occurs at one
time and the damage resulting therefrom at another. The Idaho Supreme Court has addressed this
issue holding "a cause of action for professional negligence cam10t accrue until some damage has
occurred." City oflv1cCall v. Buxton, 146 Idaho 656, 659, 201 P.3d 629, 632 (2009) (emphasis
added) (citing Stephens v. Stearns, 106 Idaho 249, 254, 678 P.2d 41,46 (1984». "The reason for the
'some damage' rule is that 'in order to recover under a theory of negligence, the plaintiff must prove
actual damage. '" ld. Meaning, the statute of limitations begins to run once the plaintiff has a
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cognizable claim including damage "that the client could recover from the professional in an action
for malpractice." Id. (citing Lapham v. Stewart, 137 Idaho 582, 586, 51 P.3d 396, 400 (2002».
The limitations period is "not extended by reasoning of any continuing consequence or
damages resulting therefrom or any continuing professional or commercial relationship between the
injured party and the alleged wrongdoer." I.e. § 5-219(4). Similarly, the limitations period is not
extended to account for actual knowledge or discovery of the harm alleged:
This court has made very clear that whether there was some damage
or whether that damage was objectively ascertainable, does not
depend upon the knowledge of the injured party because such
dependence would effectively create a discovery rule which the
legislature has expressly rejected.

Stuard v. Jorgenson, 150 Idaho 701, 704, 249 P.3d 1156, 1159 (2011). Meaning, it does not matter
when the claimant "discovered" the harm caused by the negligent conduct; so long as the harm is
"objectively ascertainable," the cause of action accrues and the statute of limitations begins to run
on the claim.
"When there is conflicting evidence as to when the cause of action accrued, the issue is one
for the trier offact." Id. However, "[i]fthe evidence reveals no disputed issues ofmaterial fact, then
only a question of law remains . . . . "

In the instant case, the facts material to the accrual

determination are not in dispute. Rather, the Minnicks challenge the district court's interpretation
of these undisputed facts.
1.

The Cause of Action Accrued on June 1,2009 When the Minnicks First Hired
a Tax Attorney to Represent Them in the Tax Court Proceedings.

Assuming arguendo: (1) the Respondents should have reviewed the conservation easement
to ensure it complied with federal income tax requirements necessary to constitute a charitable gift
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and (2) if they had, the conservation easement would have met the federal income tax requirements
necessary to constitute a charitable gift, then the Minnicks' suffered some damage on June 1,2009
when they engaged tax attorney, Tim Tarter, to address the deficiencies identified by the Internal
Revenue Service.
The Idaho Supreme Court has specifically addressed the "some damage" question in the exact
context presented here: where the alleged malpractice relates to the provision of, or failure to
provide, tax advice that results in the I.R.S. imposing additional taxes, penalties, or interest on the
client, and the client hires separate tax counsel to represent him in those tax proceedings. See Elliot
v. Parsons, 128 Idaho 723, 918 P.2d 592 (1996). In Elliotv. Parsons, the Idaho Supreme Court held

that some damage occurs to a plaintiff taxpayer at the point at which the I.R.S. "assesses" an
enforceable and collectable tax liability or earlier if the plaintiff taxpayer retains new counsel

to resolve the dispute with the I.R.S. Id. (emphasis added).
The Elliot v. Parsons decision is entirely dispositive ofthis appeal. In Elliot, the plaintiffs
owned several business entities and consulted with their attorney, Mr. Parsons, regarding a proposed
sale of various elements of their business. Id. at 724,918 P.2d 593. According to the Elliots, the
attorney was supposed to structure the transactions so that they could qualify for favorable tax
treatment. Id. After the attorney drafted the documents, and the transactions were completed, the
Elliots filed their tax returns based on the assumption that the transactions qualified for the favorable
tax treatment. Id. The I.R.S. thereafter conducted an audit and concluded that the transaction did
not qualify for the favorable tax treatment. Id. Accordingly, the I.R.S. issued a 30-Day notice of
disallowance letter on February 14, 1986, regarding the taxes due in 1982.

Id. The Elliots

immediately contacted a tax lawyer to help them address the issue. Id.
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Like the Minnicks, the Elliots filed a petition in Tax Court. Id. However, on the eve of that
trial, the Elliots reached a settlement for the amount of unpaid taxes and then sued their former
attorney, Mr. Parsons. Id.
Mr. Parsons filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that the Elliots suffered "some
damage" when they received their 30-Day notice of disallowance letter. Id. at 725,918 P.2d 594.
The district court agreed, and the Elliots appealed arguing that there cause of action could not accrue
until a decision had been reached and a final assessment charged in the Tax Court proceedings. Id.
On appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court determined that the Elliots suffered "some damage"
when they retained new tax counsel to represent them after receiving notice that their claimed
deductions had been disallowed. Id. Specifically, the Idaho Supreme Court reasoned, "the Elliots
sustained 'some damage' in the form of attorney's fees- a monetary loss they would not have
suffered but for Parsons' alleged malpractice- when they hired tax lawyers in 1986 after receiving
the 30-Day letter from the I.R.S." Id.
Just like the Plaintiffs in Elliot v. Parsons case, the Minnicks claim they were relying upon
Respondents to provide them with tax advice and Respondents did not provide it. This alleged
negligence did not give rise to damages until the I.R.S. issued its 30-day notice of disallowance and
the Minnicks hired new counsel to help them with their dealings with the I.R.S. At that point, their
cause of action accrued because, even if the Minnicks had somehow succeeded in convincing the
I.R.S. that the deduction should be allowed, the costs of defending that action would constitute
damages to be recovered from the Respondents in this action. If the Respondents had performed the
services the Minnicks contend they expected and had reviewed the conservation easement to ensure

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS AND HAWLEY, LLP, AND GEOFFREY M.
WARDLE - 19

that it complied with applicable law, then the Minnicks would not have to address any of the Tax
Court issues; the conservation easement would meet all of the applicable requirements.
Furthermore, the Tax Court proceedings will have no impact whatsoever on the Minnicks'
claim that the Respondents' conduct was negligent. The Milmicks claim that the Respondents
should have provided them with tax advice and, because they did not, the income tax deductions
were disallowed and the Minnicks had to retain counsel. The Respondents admit that they did not
provide the Minnicks with any tax advice. Thus, even if the Minnicks succeed with their Tax Court
appeal, they can still argue that the Respondents' conduct - the failure to provide tax advice - was
negligent.
While the Milmicks may hold out hope that the Tax Court's decision will be reversed, this
possibility does "not delay commencing the statute of limitations." See Reynolds v. Trout Jones
Gledhill Fuhrman, P.A., 154 Idaho 21, 25, 293 P.3d 645, 649 (2013). "The mere hope that the loss
may be recovered.. .in the future does not toll the statute oflimitations for malpractice." Id. (citing
Lapham v. Stewart, 137 Idaho at 582,584,51 P.3d at 396,398).

2.

The Minnicks' Attempt to Limit their Claims is Inconsistent with the
Allegations and Testimony in the Record and Represents an Effort to Apply a
Discover Rule to These Proceedings.

The Minnicks do not dispute that they hired tax counsel on June 1,2009 and began incurring
attorneys fees at that time. However, they dispute whether hiring tax counsel can be correctly
associated with the alleged negligence when they did not know, at the time, that the mortgage on the
property had not been subordinated to the conservation easement.
In contrast to their allegations in the Complaint, the Minnicks on summary judgment argue
that the Respondents' malpractice was the failure to subordinate the mOligage. They contend that
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they did not incur any attorneys fees specifically associated with the mortgage subordination issue
until June 10,2010. Respondents further allege that this issue was the sole basis forthe Tax Court's
adverse decision on December 17, 2012.
There are three central problems with the Minnicks' argument discussed more fully below:
first, there is no discovery rule in Idaho; second, their arguments on summary judgment are
inconsistent with their allegations in the complaint and Mr. Milmick's sworn testimony; and third,
the Minnicks were on notice of the alleged negligence by July 8, 2009 at the latest.

a.

There is No Discovery Rule in Idaho.

The Respondents' argument is a thinly-veiled attempt to breathe a discovery rule into this
discussion. This is reflected in their Complaint, which states, "On June 14,2011, the IRS requested
from the Minnicks documents showing how the conservation easement satisfied the requirements
of 26 CFR, Section 11. 170A-14(g)(2)" and "[a]s a consequence ofthis inquiry, it became apparent

and the Plaintiffs first discovered that the Defendants had failed to take actions necessary to satisfy
the subordination requirement. ... " Complaint and Demand/or Jury Trial,

~~

43-44 (emphasis

added). (R. pp. 000016-1 7).
Under Idaho law, the date a claimant discovers the harm that has occurred is of no
consequence to the question of when a cause of action accrues, because there is no discovery rule.
The fact the loan had not been subordinated was objectively ascertainable at any time after the
easement was recorded. The issue is when this latent negligence caused harm, not when the
negligence or the harm was discovered. As previously discussed, the Minnicks first suffered "harm"
attributable to the claimed negligence when they incurred attorneys' fees associated with defending
the deduction.
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b.

The District Court Properly Rejected the Minnicks' Argument that the
Negligence Alleged was Limited to the Defendants' Failure to
Subordinate the Mortgage.

To survive the statute oflimitations challenge, the Minnicks have tried to narrow the scope
of the negligence alleged. However, their current characterizations ofthe claim are inconsistent with
the record, including the Complaint and Mr. Milmick's previous sworn statements on the matter.
For example, in the Complaint, the Milmicks assert that Respondents knew or should have
known the Minnicks would need tax advice related to the conservation easement. Complaint and

Demandfor Jury Trial, ~~ 19,20,54,55. (R. pp. 00009-10, 000015-16). Paragraph 56 in particular
states:
Defendants negligently failed to analyze, understand, appreciate,
address, and resolve the tax implication ofthe charitable conservation
easement gift to the Land Trust and the legal requirements for
qualifYing for a charitable deduction to the Plaintiffs from the grant
of such easement, including but not limited to satisfYing the
requirements of 26 CFR, Section 1.170A-14(g)(2) and 26 CFR,
Section 1.1 70A -14(g)( 6).
Id. (R. 000015-16).

In addition, Mr. Minnick submitted sworn testimony to the United States Court regarding the
role of Respondents. This includes the following three statements. First:
I engaged the law firm of Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley ("Hawley
Troxell") to provide legal advice and services on all aspects of the
real estate development project that came to be known as the
Showy Phlox Subdivision.
CR. p. 000498). Second:
The attorneys at Hawley Troxell knew and appreciated, or should
have, that we were relying and depending on their law firm to address
all legal issues and concerns related to the project, including
providing necessary advice to us and handling all documentation
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required to effect the conservation easement as a charitable
deduction.

(R. p. 000500) (emphasis added). Third:
My wife and I had no prior experience with conservation easements
as a charitable gift, and we had no knowledge of the legal
requirements for charitable tax deductions from such easements. Just
as is customary in any other attorney-client relationship, we relied
entirely upon attorneys at Hawley Troxell to provide us whatever
advice and assistance was needed to comply with the applicable legal
requirements.

ld.
These statements are inconsistent with the Minnicks' current argument. If the Minnicks
relied upon the Respondents for everything associated with obtaining a tax deduction for the
easement, then any problems associated with that conservation easement would be fairly attributable
to the Respondents.
Nevertheless, in their Opening Brief on appeal, the Minnicks argue that they "retained tax
counsel initially to address a number of issues the IRS raised as reasons for disqualifying a charitable
deduction, none of which implicated a potential claim against Respondents." Appellants'

Opening Brief, p. 17 (emphasis added). The Minnicks argue as follows:
[T]he reasons for disallowance articulated by the IRS which caused
Appellants to retain tax counsel were very particular. In its 30-Day
letter ... the IRS alleged that the charitable deduction failed
(1) because it was a quid pro quo transaction with the Land Trust,
(2) because it was not 'exclusively for conservation purposes,'
(3) because there needed to be a written acknowledgment from the
Land Trust that no goods or services were provided in consideration
for the gift, and (4) because the IRS contested the value of the
donation.

Appellant's Opening Brief, pp. 17-18. Inexplicably, the Minnicks conclude: (1) "[a]ll of these
allegations involved issues unrelated to Respondents' legal services"; (2) "[ n]one give rise to a claim
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of malpractice against Respondents," and (3) "none were ever alleged as the basis of Appellants'
suit." Id. at p. 18.
These conclusions cannot withstand reasoned scrutiny. First, assuming the Minnicks relied
upon Respondents as described in Mr. Minnick's sworn statements to the Tax Court, then each and
every one of these deficiencies reflects an error on the part of the Respondents. For example, if this
development had been properly structured around an easement, then the easement itself would not
have been a condition of plat approval. The fact the conservation easement was developed within
the context of the plat approval process is fatal to any claim that it is a gift.
Second, the phrase, "exclusively for conservation purposes" is a legal requirement from 26
u.S.C. §§ 170(h)(1), 170(h)(4), and 170(h)(5) and, thus, relates directly to the perpetuity
requirements outlined in 26 CFR 1.170A-14(h), including both the proceeds and subordination
requirements. These requirements are expressly identified in the Minnicks' Complaint as bases for
the Minnicks' claims against the Respondents. Complaint and Demandfor Jury Trial, ~~ 31-34, 43,
56. (R. pp. 000012, 13, 15-16).
The Minnicks argue that "it is beyond comprehension how the trial court could believe [this]
implicated Respondents' legal services." Appellants Opening Brief, p. 20. However, the Minnicks
J

incorrectly assume that this requirement is limited to 26 U.s.C. § 170(h)(4) and is exclusively
concerned "with an interpretation of whether it preserves land in perpetuity for public recreation,
education, or scenic enjoyment, protects fish, wildlife or plat habitat or is historically important."

Id. The Minnicks completely ignore the fact this requirement includes the perpetuity requirements
of26 U.s.C. § 170(h)(5) and, thus, the very grounds for malpractice alleged in the Complaint.
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Third, the only reason the Tax Court's decision focused exclusively on the mortgage
subordination issue is because that is what the parties in the Tax Court proceedings requested the
Tax Court to do and the issue was dispositive of the entire dispute. (R. 000465, 000628-29).
Accordingly, it was not necessary for the Tax Court to address each and everyone of the deficiencies
associated with the Minnicks' conservation easement. However, ifthe Minnicks had been able to
convince the Tax Court that the loan subordination issue was not dispositive of the parties' dispute,
the Tax Court would have had a number of other issues to address, all related to the fact the
Minnicks did not receive any tax advice associated with the conservation easement.

c.

The Minnicks Should Have Known by July 8, 2009 that the Respondents
Did Not Review the Easement for Tax Purposes and Did Not Otherwise
Provide Them with Tax Advice.

The Minnicks were on notice of the alleged malpractice as of July 8, 2009 when they
received their notice of disallowance. At that point, they had already suffered some harm in the form
of attorneys fees and they were notified that the conservation easement failed to meet the applicable
regulations, including the mortgage subordination requirement.
On July 8, 2009, the Minnicks received notice that their charitable donation deductions were
disallowed for failure to meet the requirement that it was made "exclusively for conservation
purposes." (R. pp. 354, 365). The Examiner Reports specifically identify that the conservation
easement does not comply with both 26 U.S.C. § 170(h)(1) and 170(h)(5). (R. pp. 355-56, 366-67).
This is the perpetuity requirement and necessarily incorporates the loan subordination and proceeds
requirements from the regulations, 26 C.F.R. § 170A-14(g). Therefore, even assuming arguendo that
the mortgage subordination is the sole basis for the Minnicks' claim, they knew, or should have
known, about it when they received the 30-day notices on July 8, 2009.
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In conclusion, the trial court properly determined that the Minnicks' claim for negligence
accrued on or before June 1,2009 when they hired tax counsel. Alternatively, the cause of action
accrued at the latest on July 8, 2009 when the Minnicks received their 30-day letters and were placed
on notice that the conservation contribution did not satisfy the perpetuity requirement of26 U.s.e.

§ 170(h)(5) and 26 CFR § 1.170A-14(g).
D.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DECIDED TO AWARD THE RESPONDENTS'
ATTORNEYS FEES AS THE PREVAILING PARTY PURSUANT TO IDAHO CODE
§ 12-120(3).

The district court properly determined that the basis of the legal malpractice claim is a
commercial transaction. Therefore, under existing Idaho Supreme Court precedent, the Respondents
are entitled to their attorneys fees as the prevailing party.
Idaho Code Section 12-120(3) provides for an award of attorneys fees to the prevailing party
in "any civil action to recover . . . in any commercial transaction." The term "commercial
transaction" is defined in the statute to include "all transactions except transactions for personal or
household purposes." I.e. § 12-120(3).
It is undisputed that the Respondents were the prevailing party before the district court.

Appellants' Opening Brief, p. 23. The Minnicks dispute whether the parties' relationship may be
fairly characterized as "fundamentally related to a commercial transaction."
The Idaho Supreme COUli precedent is clear: attorneys fees are recoverable in attorney
malpractice cases so long as the claims are fundamentally related to a commercial transaction. See
Reynolds v. Trout Jones Gledhill Fuhrman, P.A., 154 Idaho at 26-27; Soignierv. Fletcher, 151 Idaho
322,326,256 P.3d 730 (2011).
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Idaho Code § 12-120(3) applies where a 'commercial transaction is
integral to the claim, and constitutes the basis upon which the party
is attempting to recover,' and 'thus, as long as a commercial
transaction is at the center of the lawsuit, the prevailing pm1y may be
entitled to attorneys' fees for claims that are fundamentally related to
the commercial transaction yet sound in t011.'
Reynolds, 154 Idaho at 26-27 (citations omitted).

In the Reynolds case the plaintiff had retained the defendant law firm "for the purpose of
facilitating the purchase of real property for commercial purposes" and the defendant law firm
"entered into the relationship for commercial, not altruistic purposes." Id. at 27. Accordingly, the
Court held:
Therefore, this transaction had 'the symmetry of commercial purpose
necessary to trigger I.C. § 12-120(3). The malpractice claim was
'fundamentally related' to this commercial transaction.
Consequently, as the prevailing party in an action arising from a
commercial transaction, [the defendant law firm] is entitled to
attorneys' fees and costs on appeal.
Reynolds, 154 Idaho at 27 (citations omitted).

Likewise, Plaintiffs' claims here m-e fundamentally related to a commercial transaction.
Plaintiff, Walter Minnick, hired the Defendant law firm to represent him for the purpose of
subdividing and developing the property now known as the Showy Phlox Estates. Mr. Minnick
planned to develop this property for commercial purposes (i.e. for sale to third parties). The
conservation easement was drafted and recorded within the context of this commercial transaction.
Further, the Respondents entered the relationship for commercial purposes and were paid for the
time they spent on the project. See Reynolds, 154 Idaho at 27,293 P.3d at 651.
Accordingly, the trmlsaction at issue has the symmetry of commercial purpose necessary to
trigger Idaho Code Section 12-120(3). The malpractice claim was "fundamentally related" to the
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underlying commercial transaction; the commercial transaction is integral to the claim; and the
commercial transaction occurred between the prevailing party (Respondents) and the Minnicks.
Thus, Respondents, as the prevailing party, are entitled to their reasonable attorneys' fees.
The Minnicks argue that there is no "particular transaction of a commercial nature which was
integral to and the basis of [the Minnicks'] malpractice claim." Appellants' Opening Brief, p. 27.
The Minnicks further argue, "This is not a suit like Reynolds, emanating from the drafting and
enforcement of a real estate purchase agreement." Id.
These arguments strain reason and are inconsistent with the Minnicks allegations in the
Complaint. First, the Minniks themselves sought attorneys fees under Section 12-120(3). Complaint

and Demand/or Jury Trial,

~~

52,60. Specifically, the Minnicks allege:

There existed an attorney-client relationship between Plaintiffs and
Defendants, contractual and commercial in nature, giving rise to legal
duties and obligations owed by Defendant to Plaintiffs, and each of
them, both in contract and in tort.

Id. at ~ 52 (emphasis added). (R. pp. 000016-17).
Second, in the Complaint, the Minnicks describe the complex real estate transaction
necessary to subdivide the property for sale.

~

15-17, 28. (R. p. 00008-9,28). It cannot reasonably

be disputed that the subdivision process was for a commercial purpose. Mr. Minnick subdivided the
property in order to develop and sell it. It was not a transaction for household purposes. This is true
whether the Minnicks relied entirely upon the services of the Respondents or whether they hired the
Respondents from time to time on project specific tasks. The impetus behind the subdivision
process was commercial in nature. The commercial benefit the Minnicks received was the ability
to sell lots in the Showy Phlox subdivision.
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E.

RESPONDENTS ARE ENTITLED TO ATTORNEYS FEES ON APPEAL
Assuming the Respondents are the prevailing parties in this appeal, they request their

attorneys fees pursuant to Idaho Code Section 12-120(3) for the same reasons outline above. The
nature of the parties' underlying transaction was a commercial real estate development project.
Accordingly, the attorneys fees associated with litigating this legal malpractice claim, whether at the
district or appellate court level, are appropriately deemed commercial in nature. Therefore, as the
prevailing party, the Respondents are entitled to their attorneys fees for the fees and costs associated
with defending against this appeal.
IV. CONCLUSION

The district court's decisions on the Respondents' motion for summary judgment and
subsequent request for costs and fees were well-reasoned, grounded in fact and existing law.
Accordingly, the Respondents respectfully request the Court affirm these decisions and award
Respondents their attorneys fees for the time spent on this appeal.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this )3

0

day of May, 2014.

HEPWORTH, JANIS & KLUKSDAL

IS
S

for Respondents
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The undersigned, a resident attorney of the State ofIdaho, with offices at 537 W. Bannock
S1., Ste. 200, P.O. Box 2582, Boise, Idah0Je.701-2582, and one of the attorneys for the Defendants
in this matter, certifies that on this
day of May, 2014, he caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the above and foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the
following:
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William L. Mauk
Mauk Miller & Burgoyne, LLC
515 South Sixth Street
P.O. Box 1743
Boise,ID 83701-1743

[ ] U.S. Mail
[XJ Hand Delivery
[ ] Overnight Mail
[ ] Facsimile Transmission
[ ] E-mail Transmission
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